Imperfect climate policies may be ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting their supply spatially (coined carbon leakage) or intertemporally (the green paradox). Though these effects are usually analyzed separately, the underlying mechanisms are similar. Exhaustible fossil fuel owners must trade off present and future extraction or supplying one country and the other. Whereas this is a plausible representation for oil and natural gas, important emission-intensive substitutes such as coal and uncoventional oil are so abundant that their owners face no such trade-off. A decrease in coal demand in one time period or region will therefore not trigger an equal increase in supply in the other. Moreover, if imperfect climate policies causes oil and natural gas owners to supply more in the near future or in countries with lax regulation, demand for dirtier substitutes will go down. Both effects mitigate intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage. When the substitutability between oil and coal differs across time periods or countries, a 'strong green orthodox' may occur.
Introduction
A main challenge in combating climate change is reducing the consumption of fossil fuels. A rapidly growing literature has recognized that policy makers should be careful when selecting appropriate instruments for bringing down emission levels however. Climate policies typically reduce oil demand only in some geographic areas (countries impose carbon constraints unilaterally) or in future time periods (carbon taxes are announced ahead of implementation and the development of clean alternatives is time-consuming). At the same time, the supply of conventional oil and natural gas is relatively inelastic because of limited reserves and low extraction costs. When faced with imperfect climate policies, oil and natural gas owners may thus not reduce supply but merely shift it spatially or intertemporally. Though these two channels have been named differently in the literature (carbon leakage and the green paradox, respectively) and are often analyzed separaretely, the mechanisms behind them are very similar.
When only some countries reduce their emissions, pollution might move to other countries. This 'carbon leakage' occurs through two channels [Felder and Rutherford, 1993] . Firstly, dirty industries move to countries with laxer regulation. Secondly, the stringent environmental policy in adopting countries causes the price of fossil fuels to fall, increasing their use in non-adopting regions. Several papers have attempted to estimate the magnitude of this carbon leakage with computable general equilibrium (CGE) models [Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2000 , Paltsev, 2001 , Babiker, 2005 . The reported leakage rates range from a modest 2-5% to over 100% (the latter implying that unilateral carbon-reduction policies actually increase global emissions). Similar effects are found in studies on international environmental agreements: when one group of countries jointly reduce their emissions, non-conforming countries will free ride on their efforts and pollute more [Barrett, 1994 , Hoel, 1994 .
Similarly, policies that reduce future dependence on fossil fuels might encourage exhaustible resource owners, anticipating a drop in future demand, to bring forward the extraction of their resources. In this way, well-intended green policies may actually increase emissions. Sinn [2008a] coined this phenomenon the 'green paradox'. Whereas Sinn was mainly concerned with the potentially harmful effects of increasing future carbon taxes, other authors noted a similar effect can be caused by the development of a clean backstop technology: a carbon-free substitute for fossil fuels. Strand [2007] and Hoel [2008] show that reducing the costs of renewable energy sources can increase the present value of emissions damages. However, this result may vanish if the extraction costs of the exhaustible resource decline in the remaining stock (i.e. when oil reserves dwindle, extraction becomes increasingly costly) or when the substitute has an upward-sloping supply curve [Gerlagh, 2011] .
The sensitivity of the green paradox to different types of backstops is examined by van der Ploeg and Withagen [2009] , who distinguish between cheap and expensive and between clean and dirty backstops. The latter denote substitutes for oil and natural gas that have higher emission intensities, most notably coal and oil from tar sands. They find that the green paradox occurs for clean but expensive backstops (such as solar or wind), but not when the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to emissions damages, as it is then attractive to leave part of the oil in the ground. van der Ploeg and Withagen [2011] show that rising carbon taxes may not cause the green paradox when coal, rather than renewables, is the primary alternative for oil. Moreover, it can be optimal to subsidize renewables to just below the price of coal.
Considering dirty backstops is important from a policy perspective. Whereas oil or natural gas reserves might be depleted in the next century under businessas-usual consumption 1 , coal 2 and tar sands 3 are in much more abundant supply.
At the same time, these energy sources are very carbon-intensive. Per unit of energy, they emit approximately 1.3-1.4 (1.8-2 if processed into synthetic fuels [Marland, 1983] ) and 1.17 [Charpentier et al., 2009] times as many greenhouse gases as petroleum respectively. To keep global warming within tolerable limits, it is therefore not only important to reduce or delay oil and natural gas extraction, but also to ensure they are not replaced with dirty alternatives.
We seek to contribute to the literature in a number of ways. We develop a framework that allows the analysis of both carbon leakage and the green paradox: two phenomena that are usually studied separately even though they are very similar. We define leakage as the shift in emissions from the future to the present or from conforming to non-conforming countries. The difference between intertemporal and spatial leakage is the presence or absence of a discount rate. We show that the presence of an abundant dirty backstop reduces spatial and intertemporal carbon leakage directly and indirectly, and can even cause negative leakage rates.
By virtue of the abundance of their resource, owners of dirty backstops do not need to trade off present and future extraction or supplying one country and the other. When faced with a demand reduction in the future or in a group of climate-conscious countries, they will thus not shift their supply to the present or to countries with lax regulation. When exhaustible resource emissions 'leak' away to the present or to non-conforming countries, the resulting leakage is mitigated indirectly because the increased exhaustible resource supply reduces demand for the dirty backstop. Imperfect climate policies can even reduce emissions in both time periods or both countries. Carbon taxes may cause negative leakage rates when the substitutability between the exhaustible 1 According to the 2010 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, at 2009 consumption rates proved reserves for oil and natural gas will be exhausted in 2052 and 2073 respectively 2 Proved coal reserves will last until 2260 at current consumption (BP) 3 Reserves in Alberta alone are estimated at 1700 trln barrels (Source: Alberta's Energy
Outlook and Supply/Demand Outlook 2010 -2019 resource and the dirty backstop differs between time periods or countries. We may also call this a 'strong green orthodox' [Grafton et al., 2010] . Developing a clean backstop can reduce present emissions when the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop are good substitutes and if the emission-intensity of the dirty backstop is high.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the model. We consider a dirty exhaustible resource, an even dirtier backstop and a clean backstop; for ease of interpretation, we sometimes refer to these as energy types. We allow for a general substitutability structure between energy types. The model is extended to two-period and two-country settings. In section 3 we analyze intertemporal and spatial leakage when carbon emissions are taxed in the future (in the two-period model) or in one country (in the two-country model). The interplay between demand for the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop reduces carbon leakage. Interestingly, a future carbon tax may cause exhaustible resource owners to delay rather than speed up extraction, and a unilateral carbon tax may reduce welfare in other countries. In section 4, we evaluate the impact of a cheaper clean backstop in the future. We obtain stricter conditions for the green paradox than models that do not include the interplay between exhaustible resource and dirty backstop demand. The models are calibrated with interfuel elasticity estimates from previous work. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
Consider a model with three types of energy: an exhaustible resource (oil or natural gas), a dirty backstop (coal or unconventional oil) and a clean backstop (solar or wind power). The backstops are inexhaustible, supplied competitively and have constant marginal costs 4 . The exhaustible resource is supplied competitively by a group of energy-exporters and costless to extract. We assume that for the energy-exporters, it is always optimal to fully exhaust the fossil resource stock S 5 . An energy-importing country derives utility from consuming energy. Energy consumption of each type is subject to decreasing marginal utility and types are imperfect substitutes. Denote the exhaustible resource, the dirty and the clean backstop with superscripts F , Z and C respectively.
4 An upward-sloping supply curve for the clean backstop reduces intertemporal leakage [Gerlagh, 2011] . 5 Relaxing this assumption makes the intertemporal leakage less severe Withagen, 2009, Fischer and Salant, 2010] .
Demand functions are given by
Letting q F denote the equilibrium quantity of the exhaustible resource, its in-
where for future reference we note that
and
Energy types are imperfect substitutes for one another: demand for each type is increasing in the price of other types (A.2) and own-price effects are stronger than cross-price effects (A.3). We also assume that cross-price effects are symmetric (A.4).
We show in Appendix A.1 that (A.4) holds if we can rewrite the demand structure as demand for a composite good that is produced from F , Z and C according to a homogeneous function 6 . This is satisfied for example by CES demand functions.
In the main text, we will use elasticities η ij of demand for type i with respect to the price of type j:
Some energy carriers are also used to produce other goods (e.g. plastics from petroleum).
This can be reconciled with assumption (A.4) if the production function of the other good is homogeneous of the same degree as that of the composite good.
Consumption of the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop generates a constant amount of emissions. We assume that the dirty backstop is more emission-intensive than the exhaustible resource
We will extend the model in the time (section 2.1) and space (section 2.2) dimension.
Intertemporal Leakage
In the sections on intertemporal carbon leakage, we append the model to include a second time period. Denote time by subscript t, t ∈ {1, 2}. Exhaustible resource owners discount future revenues at rate r and must decide on the intertemporal extraction pattern. In equilibrium, they are indifferent between extracting now and in the future
Let q F 1 denote period 1 exhaustible resource extraction. Substituting the stock constraint, the indifference condition (5) reads
We allow for emissions in the first period to be more harmful than emissions in the second period, so that total emission damages are
When only cumulative emissions matter, β is equal to one. When society and ecology can adapt more easily to slow rather than rapid temperature increases Kverndokk, 1996, Gerlagh, 2011 ], a higher weight should be put on near-term emissions (β < 1). The green paradox entails a positive relation between the future climate policy θ 2 and emissions [Sinn, 2008b] . Following Gerlagh [2011] , we differentiate between a weak green paradox (the future climate policy increases present emissions) and a strong green paradox (emission damages increase).
Definition 1. The weak green paradox occurs if
The strong green paradox occurs if
Analogous to the literature on (spatial) carbon leakage, we define the intertemporal carbon leakage of a future climate policy as the share of period 2 emission reductions that 'leaks' away to the first period.
Definition 2. The intertemporal leakage β * t of second-period policy θ 2 is the increase in period 1 emissions over the decrease in period 2 emissions.
Both green paradoxes can be related to the intertemporal leakage rate β * t in a straightforward way. As intertemporal leakage is positive if and only if the future carbon tax increases present emissions, the weak green paradox is equivalent to β * t > 0. The strong green paradox occurs if the leakage rate exceeds the emission discount rate (β * t > β). We will employ the following shorthand notation:
Spatial Leakage
For analyzing spatial leakage, we consider two countries. Denote a conforming country with subscript A and a non-conforming country with subscript B. The countries are of the same size, have identical demand functions and differ only with respect to climate policy. The price of the exhaustible resource must be equal in both countries p
Letting q F A denote the equilibrium quantity of the exhaustible resource consumed in country A, this translates into a condition identical to (6) except for the absence of a discount rate
Emission damages are equal to the unweighted sum of emissions
Definition 3. Spatial carbon leakage β * s of unilateral policy θ A is the increase in emissions in country B over the emission reduction in country A
Total emissions go down when β * s < 1. When β * s < 0, the unilateral policy decreases emissions in both countries.
We will discuss carbon taxes (section 3) and investment in green technologies (section 4) in turn, differentiating between intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage. In both sections, our focus will be on the impact of (stricter) climate policies on emissions through the pattern of exhaustible resource extraction and changes in the level of dirty backstop use.
Emission Taxes
In this section, we analyze intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage as a result of a carbon tax. In the conforming policy area, each unit of carbon emitted is taxed at a constant rate w. The tax rate may also be interpreted as a willingness to pay to reduce emissions [Hoel, 2010] . Denote net prices (inclusive of the tax) with tildes.
Intertemporal Leakage
Regulators that want to reduce carbon emissions may not be able to do so immediately. Swift implementation of climate policies is often constrained by political and technological considerations. Announcing carbon taxes or caps in advance may reduce compliance costs: it gives firms the opportunity to purchase abatement equipment and adjust their production processes, and consumers can make informed durable good purchasing decisions [Di Maria et al., 2008] . Let carbon be taxed in the second period only:
{F, Z}. Exhaustible resource owners discount future receipts net of the tax at the interest rate: p
A second-period carbon tax is transmitted to the first period through its effects on the exhaustible resource prices. The change in first-period emissions is given by
We discuss the two components of this term in turn. Period 2 exhaustible resource rents and, by (8), the period 1 price goes up if the carbon tax would increase future exhaustible resource demand. The carbon tax directly reduces exhaustible resource demand in the second period by −ζ
The tax has an even stronger effect on the future price of the dirty backstop by virtue of its high emission intensity however. This induces substitution from the dirty backstop to the exhaustible resource, increasing future exhaustible resource demand by ζ Z η
7 By assumption (A.4) (symmetric cross-effects), this is
The period 1 exhaustible resource price goes up (down) if the net effect of the tax on exhaustible resource demand
is positive (negative), i.e. if the substitutability between the dirty backstop and the exhaustible resource will be high (low) in the future and if the emissionintensity of the dirty backstop is relatively high (low).
The effect of exhaustible resource prices on period 1 emissions is very similar. An increase in the period 1 exhaustible resource price directly reduces emissions by −ζ F η
Higher exhaustible resource prices also encourage substitution towards the emission-intensive dirty backstop, increasing emissions by
. The net change in emissions
is positive (negative) if the dirty backstop and the exhaustible resource are good (poor) substitutes in the first period. This expression only differs from the change in future exhaustible resource demand given above through the time subscripts. In a stationary economy, in which the demand function is equal in both time periods and the interest rate is zero, the condition for
0 is identical to the one for ∂E1 ∂ p F 1 0. The intertemporal leakage rate is then always nonnegative. We formalize this in the following Lemma. Lemma 1. If the economy is stationary (the demand elasticities are equal in both periods and the interest rate is zero), β * t > 0 except when
in which case β * t = 0.
Proposition 1 describes the general case.
7 Persson et al. [2007] use an integrated assessment model to show that OPEC countries may benefit rather than lose from strict climate policies, as the price of synthetic substitutes for petroleum-based fuels (e.g. diesel from coal) goes up faster than the price of oil.
Proposition 1 (weak green paradox). When a period 2 carbon tax is implemented, β * t 0 iff
The weak green paradox is less likely if the substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop is different in the two periods. When demand for the dirty backstop is inelastic with respect to exhaustible resource prices in both periods (η ZF 1 and η ZF 2 are both low), the tax reduces the exhaustible price and increases emissions in the near term. This is the classic green paradox when exhaustible resource owners anticipate a future carbon tax [Di Maria et al., 2008 , Hoel, 2010 . When demand for the dirty backstop is inelastic with respect to exhaustible resource prices in the first period but very elastic in the second (η ZF 1 is low, while η ZF 2 is high), the tax increases the exhaustible resource price and emissions go down in both periods. This corresponds to a setting in which coal is only used to generate electricity in the present, but can be converted to transportation fuel in the future. The tax induces oil owners to delay extraction as it puts them at a comparative advantage in the transportation market in the future. Since coal is a poor substitute for oil in the short term, the decline in period 1 oil supply does not cause a surge in coal demand.
When coal demand reacts strongly to exhaustible resource prices in the first period but not in the second (η ZF 1 is high, but η ZF 2 is low), the tax reduces the price of the exhaustible resource and emissions go down in both periods. This case could correspond to a large coal-to-liquids (CTL) user denouncing this technology in the future. Currently, only South Africa employs CTL processes on a large scale 8 . The reduction in oil prices does not bring about a large shift from oil to coal in the future, but makes oil an attractive substitute for coal in the near term. Lastly, when the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop are good substitutes in both periods (η ZF 1 and η ZF 2 are both high), the tax increases exhaustible resource prices in both periods and increases emissions in the first period.
The effects of a period 2 tax on future emissions and emission damages are discussed in Propositon 2.
Proposition 2 (strong green paradox). When a period 2 carbon tax is implemented,
Notice that although the tax increases future demand for the clean backstop, clean backstop prices, quantities and elasticities do not appear in the conditions for β * > 0 and β * > β. This is because the clean backstop does not generate emissions (so D C does not enter into either E 1 or Σ) and because the tax does not affect the price of the clean backstop (so The strong green paradox can only materialize if the weak green paradox occurs and the emissions discount rate is sufficiently high. A higher dirty backstop demand elasticity causes the tax to more sharply reduce period 2 dirty backstop use, and therefore reduces leakage. The effect of the own-and crossprice elasticities of the exhaustible resource on the intertemporal leakage rate cannot be signed because the effect of the tax on exhaustible resource extraction is ambiguous. Our findings relate to Eichner and Pethig [2009] . Albeit through a different mechanism (substitution between energy types rather than intertemporal substitution in consumption), they also show that a future emission constraint need not cause the green paradox 9 .
The interpretation of equation (10) is tedious, but β * t can be calibrated as estimates of all parameters in (10) are available. Take oil as the exhaustible resource and coal as the dirty backstop. Converting coal consumption to barrels of oil equivalent (boe), we calculate the emission-intensity ζ of each resource as total emissions over total quantity consumed. Current oil and coal demand is observed, and predictions on future oil ( q F 2 ) and coal (q Z 2 ) demand are available from the IEA. An overview of these statistics is presented in Table 1 . Demand elasticities are estimated in an empirical literature on interfuel substitution. This literature distinguishes between coal and electricity as input in the industrial process. Since most coal is used for electricity generation, we take the elasticities for electricity as those for the dirty backstop 10 . The first four columns in Table 2 contain the estimated own-and cross-price elasticities for oil and electricity from six studies. Lacking estimates on future demand elasticities, we assume these to be equal to the current values. Using the parameters from Table 1 , for each set of estimates we determine the change in oil extraction and emissions as well as the intertemporal carbon leakage β * t as the result of a tax increase.
The intertemporal leakage rate is positive for all elasticity estimates. The substitutability between oil and coal is limited, so the reduction in future oil demand through higher own prices outweighs the increase in future demand through substitution from coal to oil. As a result, oil producers extract more in the first period. This causes some substitution from coal to oil in the first period, but not enough to offset the increase in oil-related emissions. The leakage rates are small however as coal use goes down significantly in the second period. Leakage is highest for the elasticity estimates in Pindyck [1979] : the low ownprice elasticity of coal demand causes the carbon tax to be relatively ineffective in reducing period 2 coal demand, and the low cross-price elasticity of coal ensures period 1 coal consumption does not react sharply to the increase in oil supply. The sum of period 1 and 2 emission reductions is almost linear in η ZZ .
The emission reductions in the second period may still be biased downwards since we conservatively assumed that oil reserves are fully exhausted.
Spatial Leakage
In this section we drop the time dimension from the model and focus on spatial differences in climate policy. When only one country (or group of countries) implements a carbon cap or tax, the beneficial effect of its reduced emissions may be mitigated by an increase in emissions in other countries. Emission-intensive industries may circumvent the carbon restriction by relocating to countries with lax regulations. Secondly, the lower demand for carbon fuels in the adopting country decreases the price of these commodities on the world market, making them more attractive for foreign firms to use in the production process. This phenonomenon has been coined carbon leakage in the literature [Felder and Rutherford, 1993] . Though our setting does not include industry location, the model is well suited to predict the influence of a unilateral carbon tax on emissions through world market prices. The results are similar to the ones we obtained when the carbon tax is implemented only in the future. A carbon tax in one country need not increase emissions in non-adopting countries. We calibrate a simple demand structure and find that the world market price effect causes only very modest carbon leakage. Our results suggest that high leakage rates as in Babiker [2005] require very large industry relocation effects.
Proposition 3. When country A implements a carbon tax unilaterally,
The carbon tax in country A reduces total emissions Ξ. The conditions for a negative spatial leakage rate are analogous to those for negative intertemporal leakage in section 3.1. The second term in brackets is positive (negative) when the unilateral tax increases (decreases) exhaustible resource demand in country A. The first term determines whether emissions in country B increase (positive) or decrease (negative) in the exhaustible resource price. Carbon leakage can be negative when the substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop differs across countries. Notice that if the tax causes an increase in exhaustible resource demand in country A (i.e. when the second term is positive), country B is made worse off by country A's climate policy.
We calibrate Proposition 3 to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and evaluate the leakage to the rest of the world (ROW) if the ETS carbon price would increase above its current level. Fossil fuel consumption in the EU and ROW as well as prices, corrected for a carbon price of e 15 per ton in the EU, are shown in Table 3 . We assume that the elasticities are equal in both regions.
The effects of a carbon tax increase in the EU are shown in Table 4 . The spatial leakage rates are much higher than the intertemporal rates in Table 2 . Though the EU only accounts for a small part of global energy demand, the EU consumes relatively more oil compared to coal than the world at large. A carbon tax in the EU therefore affects oil demand in the EU relatively more than a global tax would affect global oil demand. Furthemore, the absence of a discount rate exacerbates the reaction of oil suppliers. A unilateral tax increase thus causes a stronger shift in oil supplies than a future tax did in section 3.1. As a result, the increase in emissions in ROW is larger than the increase in present emissions brought about by a future tax in the previous section. At the same time, the unilateral tax has a relatively modest effect on coal consumption in the EU as coal demand is already very low to begin with. These two forces contrive to cause higher spatial leakage rates. The ordering of leakage rates is similar to that of the intertemporal rates. Leakage is lower when coal demand is more elastic (as the tax then decreases coal demand more strongly in the EU) and when the cross-elasticities of oil and coal are large compared to the own-price elasticity of oil (this decreases the shift in oil supply to ROW and amplifies the drop in coal demand in ROW , respectively).
The leakage rates in Table 4 are much smaller than some estimates reported in the CGE literature on carbon leakage. Babiker [2005] , who finds leakage rates up to 130%, claims that most CGE models do not model industry location correctly and thus underestimate the leakage rate. Our model does not include production, but it can be argued that industry location is implicit in the demand function. Other authors are of the opinion that the energy price channel is the most important determinant of carbon leakage [Paltsev, 2001 , Fischer and Fox, 2009 , Kuik and Hofkes, 2010 .
A Cheaper Clean Backstop
Instead of implementing a carbon tax, climate-conscious countries may opt to reduce emissions by stimulating the development of clean alternatives to fossil fuels. Such investments have strong public good characteristics: once a breakthrough has been achieved in one country, the technology quickly becomes available in other countries [Golombek and Hoel, 2004, Gerlagh and Kuik] . As technology differences for renewable energy sources between countries are likely to be limited, we restrict ourselves to intertemporal carbon leakage in this section.
Intertemporal Leakage
Developing alternative energy sources requires resources to be committed well before new technologies can be put to use. The cost of the clean backstop is lower in the second period: p decreases the right hand side of (6). For exhaustible resource owners to remain indifferent between extracting in either period, period 1 extraction q F 1 must go up. This is the classic green paradox result [Strand, 2007 , Hoel, 2008 . In the next Propositions, we show how the occurence of the weak and the strong green paradox depend on the emission intensities and the substitutability structure.
Proposition 4 (weak green paradox). When the clean backstop becomes cheaper in period 2, β *
As opposed to the implementation of a future carbon tax, exhaustible resource owners always bring extraction forward when clean alternatives become cheaper in the future. The lower period 1 exhaustible resource price also causes a drop in demand for the emission-intensive dirty backstop however. Both of these effects are proportional to the change in period 1 exhaustible resource extraction
. Because period 2 parameters only affect period 1 emissions through this term, the condition for the weak green paradox solely consists of period 1 parameters. The occurence of the weak green paradox hinges on whether the increase in exhaustible resource-related emissions outweighs the decrease in dirty backstop-related emissions (12). This is more likely if the relative emissionintensity of the exhaustible resource is high (this puts a higher weight on the increase in exhaustible resource demand vis a vis the drop in demand for the dirty backstop) and if the substitutability between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop is low (this dampens the response of dirty backstop demand to the drop in exhaustible resource prices).
In order to facilitate calibrations, we may rewrite the condition for the weak green paradox as ζ
In Table 1 , we saw that Tables 2 and 4 , so the development of clean technologies is likely to bring about the weak green paradox.
Proposition 5 (strong green paradox). When the clean backstop becomes cheaper in period 2,
(ii) β * t increases in η F C and |η F F | (iii) β * t decreases in η ZF and η
ZC
The technological advance reduces the price of the exhaustible resource in both periods: the indifference requirement (5) mandates that the price drop in period 1 (brought about by increased supply) is accompanied by a proportional decrease in period 2. Together with the lower period 2 clean backstop prices, this reduces demand for the dirty backstop in both periods. This means that the strong green paradox can only arise if the lower p C 2 causes a sufficiently large shift in the extraction pattern of the exhaustible resource, so that the damage from bringing forward exhaustible resource emissions (the denominator in (13)) exceeds the benefits of reduced dirty backstop consumption in both periods (the two terms in the numerator). Intertemporal leakage decreases in η ZF and η ZC (as the technology advance then induces more substitution away from the dirty backstop). When η F C is high, a decrease in p C 2 triggers a stronger shift in the intertemporal extraction pattern of the exhaustible resource. The resulting price drop, which is an important determinant of substitution from the dirty backstop to the exhaustible resource, depends negatively on the ownprice elasticity |η F F |. Therefore, β * t increases in η F C and |η F F |. We calibrate Proposition 5 at the end of this section.
Under reasonable assumptions on the substitutability structure, we are able to obtain more powerful results about the occurence of the green paradox, as we will show in the next Corollaries. The energy market can be divided into a submarket for electricity and one for transport. Natural gas (F ), coal (Z) and wind and solar energy (C) more readily lend themselves for electricity generation, whereas oil (F ), tar sands (Z) and biofuels (C) are foremostly used in the transportation sector. It can be argued that two energy types that are employed in the same submarket are very close substitutes.
Case I: Developing Alternative Fuels
Suppose that the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop are perfect substitutes. Food-based biofuels, though not efficient enough to completely replace petroleum-based fuels [Hill et al., 2006] , enjoy significant market shares in the US and Brazil already. Synthetic biofuels are a promising alternative in the long run, but still require very large R&D efforts [Blok, 2006 , IEA, 2010 . We are primarily interested in this case as a reference point however: the assumption that clean backstops are perfect substitutes for exhaustible fossil fuels is common in green paradox models. It leads to the most powerful green paradox results in the literature: when the substitutability between fossil fuel and the clean backstop is high, a cheaper green backstop will cause a larger exhaustible resource demand drop in the future and consequently a larger increase in short-term extraction. When the exhaustible resource and the green backstop are imperfect substitutes, exhaustible resource owners are ensured of future demand for their commodities even at higher prices, and the green paradox may vanish [Gerlagh, 2011] . Corollary 1. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop
The price of the exhaustible resource no longer depends on supply but is fully determined by the period 2 clean backstop price. The numerator of (14), which reflects the sensitivity of dirty backstop demand with respect to exhaustible resource (and clean backstop) prices, is therefore independent of q F 1 . As in section 4, the Strong GP is less likely the higher the substitution between the dirty backstop and the exhaustible resource, and the lower the increase in period 1 exhaustible resource extraction as a result of lower period 2 clean backstop prices. In accordance with the literature, the condition for the Strong GP is weaker than in the general case. In (13), the only effect that is not proportional to the intertemporal change in exhaustible resource extraction The results from Corollary 1 show that if we take into consideration the availability of dirty backstops, the substitutability structure that is most condusive to the green paradox no longer suffices for its occurence: even when the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop are perfect substitutes, both shortterm emissions and the emission damages may go down as a result of lower clean backstop prices.
Case II: Renewable Energy for Electricity
An empirically very relevant case is perfect substitutability between the clean and dirty backstop. The opportunities to employ renewable energy are highest in the electricity sector. Coal and renewable energy sources are main inputs for electricity generation, with worldwide market shares of 42% and 19% in 2008 respectively [IEA, 2010] . Most renewable electricity is currently generated from hydropower, but wind, solar and geothermal energy also offer important growth potential. With appropriate government policies to promote their development, the share of renewable electricity could increase to 32% in 2035 [IEA, 2010] . Investing in hydro-, wind-and solar power may reduce coal use without causing as strong an increase in short-term oil extraction as in Case I.
Corollary 2. With perfect substitution between the clean and the dirty backstop
When the clean backstop is more expensive than a perfect substitute in both periods, it is used in neither period and a small cost reduction has no effect. Similarly, if it is cheaper than the dirty backstop in both periods, the dirty backstop is never used. The model is then reduced to a classic green paradox model and both the weak and the strong green paradox occur: the total amount of exhaustible resource extraction remains the same, but part of it is brought forward as a result of lower period 2 clean backstop prices. The effect of clean backstop prices on emissions is discontinuous when the prices of the clean and dirty backstop are equal: demand for the dirty backstop then drops to zero. Lastly, when the clean backstop is already cheaper than the dirty backstop in the second period, further cost reductions only reduce present dirty backstop use, at the cost of accelerated exhaustible resource extraction. Notice that in this case, the only difference between the conditions for the weak and strong green paradox is that the increase in period 1 exhaustible resource emissions is weighted with factor 1 − β: the extra harm of present relative to future emissions.
Keeping global warming within acceptable limits largely depends on replacing coal with clean alternatives as the largest source of electricity. Our results suggest that from an environmental point of view, investing in these alternatives is primarily attractive while they are still more expensive than coal. This directly reduces future coal use, without bringing forward emissions from oil. When cost parity will already be reached in the future, additional investment does not cause a further reduction in future coal use, and only reduces present coal use indirectly. The strong green paradox then becomes more likely. This result relates to Fischer and Salant [2010] and van der Ploeg and Withagen [2011] . Fischer and Salant [2010] analyze the effect of cheaper backstops in the presence of high-and low-cost oil. They find that for moderate investments, the cheaper backstop will cause the high-cost oil to remain in the ground and thus improve the environment. Beyond that point, further investments will bring forward the extraction of the low-cost oil and cause a 'renewed' green paradox. van der Ploeg and Withagen [2011] argue that it can be optimal to subsidize renewables to just below the price of coal if global warming damages are sufficiently severe.
Case III: Conventional and Unconventional Oil
In this subsection, we look at the effects of cheaper renewable electricity on the use of unconventional oil. Tar sands deposits in Canada and Venezuela are thought to exceed reserves of conventional oil. Extracting energy from uncoventional oil is relatively costly: most new oil sands projects are estimated to be profitable at oil prices of $65-$75 per barrel [IEA, 2010] . Unconventional oil is also more emission-intensive: producing synthetic crude oil from tar sands generates 3-4 times as many emissions as from conventional oil; as most emissions from oil are generated during consumption however, the difference in well-towheels emissions is in the order of 15-20% [Charpentier et al., 2009] .
Corollary 3. With perfect substitution between the exhaustible resource and the dirty backstop (i) if ψ 2 < p Z , both the Weak and the strong green paradox occur
neither the Weak nor the strong green paradox occurs
The environmental implications of investment in the green backstop are similar as in subsection 4.1.2. If the economy is under regime (ii), cost reductions will initally benefit the environment by reducing the use of the dirty backstop in period 2, without affecting the pattern of exhaustible resource extraction. At a certain point however, demand for the dirty backstop in period 2 will go to zero and the economy moves into regime (i), in which additional investment only brings forward the extraction of the exhaustible resource and the green paradox returns. 
Empirical Calibration
Finally, we calibrate Proposition 5. The interfuel substitution estimates in section 3 do not distinguish between carbon-and non-carbon energy inputs. We thus follow the CGE literature on carbon leakage and assume a nested CES demand structure. Let demand be of the form proposed in [Keller, 1976] and consider two nests: electricity E and non-electricity N . Coal (Z) and solar energy (C) are the only inputs for electricity generation; oil is the only energy source in the non-electricity nest. The elasticity of substitution within nests is larger than between nests [Kemfert and Welsch, 2000] : σ E,N = 1.5, σ Z,C = 5. Emission intensities and prices for oil and coal are as in Table 1 . We take solar electricty to be 2.22 times as expensive as electricity from coal initially 11 , so that p C 1 is $64.38. Let r = 0.68 (this corresponds to a yearly interest rate of 2% over 26 years) and assume the economy grows at the interest rate. The stock of oil and available income are calibrated such that the initial oil price equals the 2009 average price of $59. Intertemporal carbon leakage is as defined in Definition 2.
The period 1 oil price is depicted in Figure 4 .2. The oil price is decreasing 11 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/electricity generation.html The effect is modest for small cost reductions owing to the limited substitutability between oil and electricity. When the clean backstop becomes very cheap however, it emerges as an attractive substitute for oil and the oil price reacts more strongly.
The pattern of intertemporal carbon leakage is similar (Figure 4.2) . When the reduction in p C 2 is not too large, it mainly induces substitution from coalto solar-based electricity. The change in the pattern of oil extraction is very small, giving rise to very modest intertemporal leakage rates. The leakage rate goes up only when the clean backstop becomes very cheap in the future: coal is then hardly used anymore, and subsequent cost reductions mostly serve to bring forward the extraction of oil. This finding nicely complements the intuition behind Corollary 2, in which the clean and dirty backstop are perfect substitutes. From an environmental point of view, investment in renewable energy sources is primarily attractive insofar as it reduces the use of dirty backstops. When this goal has been achieved already, intertemporal carbon leakage becomes a stronger concern.
Conclusion
In this paper we employed a stylized model to analyze carbon leakage in the presence of an abundant dirty backstop such as coal or uncoventional oil. Our framework can be used to study both intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage. Whereas the result from the green paradox literature that the development of a clean backstop or an anticipated carbon tax can speed up extraction of oil and natural gas is insightful, it might overstate the adverse consequences of these policies by not taking into account their potential to reduce emissions from coal and unconventional oil.
Though a carbon tax increases the price of oil and natural gas, the price of coal goes up even more. The effect of an anticipated carbon tax on oil and gas demand, and thus on the intertemporal extraction pattern, depends on the relative strength of a direct own-price and an indirect substitution (from coal to oil and gas) effect. When improved technology (e.g. diesel from coal) makes coal a better substitute for oil in the future than it is today, intertemporal leakage may become negative: anticipated carbon taxes cause substitution from coal to oil in the future and thus induce oil owners to delay extraction, but the reduction in present oil supplies does not trigger a large increase in present coal demand as coal is still a poor substitute for oil today.
Our calibrations suggest that if a future carbon increases present emissions, the effect is relatively small. When climate policies are spatially imperfect (only some countries impose a carbon tax), we find much lower carbon leakage rates than the 100% that would obtain in a model with only one exhaustible resource that is supplied perfectly inelastically, as non-adopting countries compensate increased emissions from one energy type with lower emissions from another.
The future availability of a clean backstop lowers dirty backstop emissions directly (through substitution from the dirty to the clean backstop) and indirectly (the clean backstop reduces oil prices, which encourages substitution away from dirty backstops). These effects can become even more important when dirty backstops are an even more prominent source of energy in the future. Anticipated cost reductions for clean backstops are likely to increase emissions initially, but the reduction in future emissions is considerably larger (as in the case of future caron taxes). Our results suggest that climate policies are worthwhile even if it is not possible to instate all-encompassing carbon constraints.
The production function for the composite good is Y = f ( q). Define the conditional expenditure function e (Y, p) as the minimum cost to produce Y given prices p. Then conditional demand for energy types exhibits symmetric crosseffects:
By homogeneity of f ( q), we have
Lastly, define demand for the composite good D Y (π ( p)) and the unconditional demand for energy types
Since the conditional cross-effects are equal, the unconditional cross-effects are also equal.
A.2 Proposition 1
Proof. Period 1 emissions only depend on p ∂w2 < 0 is that the tax increases demand for the exhaustible resource at current prices: ∂D
Here we can see that period 2 extraction increases if the indirect (substitution from the dirty backstop to the exhaustible resource) outweighs the direct (a higher effective exhaustible resource price) effect of the tax on exhaustible resource demand. Rearranging and using (A.4) gives
The condition for the weak green paradox is
Taking into account the sign of
∂w2 and using (3), this translates into   ζ
A.3 Proposition 2
Proof. The tax w 2 cannot increase the price of the exhaustible resource more than that of the dirty backstop
If the inequality were reversed, exhaustible resource demand would go down in period 2 by (A.3). The period 2 gross price of the exhaustible resource goes up, so for owners to remain indifferent between extracting in either period (8), so must the period 1 price. Demand would go down in both periods, which would violate the full extraction requirement. The same argument can be used to show that (17) and (A.3) entail ∂D Z 2 ∂w2 < 0, which proves (i). It is then straightforward that (ii) and (iii) hold if period 2 exhaustible resource extraction decreases ( ∂ q F 1 ∂w2 > 0). We proceed to prove (ii) and (iii) if
By the chain rule ∂ψ2 ∂w2 can be rewritten as ζ Z ∂ψ2 ∂ p Z , to which we can apply (4)
In this expression, the first two terms are negative and the last two terms are positive. The first term outweighs the third term by (A.3) and the second term outweighs the fourth term (this follows from Proposition 1 and our assumption that ∂ q F 1 ∂w2 < 0). This completes the proof of (ii). Notice that since the tax reduces period 2 emissions, the strong green paradox implies the weak green paradox (as in section 4). To prove (iii), we must show that ∂w2 < 0 (which implies that exhaustible resource prices rise in both periods), i.e. that
In order to back out the change exhaustible resource extraction
∂w2 , substitute the equilibrium exhaustible resource price in (8) and totally differentiate with respect to w 2
We then find ∂ q
Here, apply (3) and (4) and multiply the numerator and denominator with
The fraction is smaller than one (A.3). The term in brackets is positive (since we assumed
The condition for the strong green paradox is analogous to Proposition 5 with one caveat: if ∂ q F 1 ∂w2 < 0, the sign of the inequality changes.
Divide both the numerator and denominator of the second part of the first term by
A.4 Proposition 3
Proof. Analogous to Propositions 1 and 2
A.5 Proposition 4
Proof. Determine the condition for
is negative by (A.3), so the term in brackets must be positive for the weak green paradox to materialize: A reduction in p C 2 increases period 1 exhaustible resource extraction
The intertemporal price path of the exhaustible resource must satisfy (5)
Substitute in (23)
As in Proposition 4, dividing by
Applying (3) and divide the numerator and denominator by
can be backed out from (24):
Substitute in (26), so that the final condition becomes
Proof. (i) follows immediately. If the exhaustible resource price in period 2 is bound by the clean backstop price (ii), p F 2 decreases by the same amount as p
When the exhaustible resource and the clean backstop are perfect substitutes, by the intertemporal indifference condition we have
1+r . The increase in period 1 extraction that brings about this price reduction is
Plugging this in, the condition for the strong green paradox becomes
Proof. 
A.9 Corollary 3
Proof. If the exhaustible resource price would always be lower than p Z (i), the model is equivalent to a setting without the dirty backstop, and we have both green paradoxes for the usual reasons. Under (ii), the dirty backstop is only used in the second period (if the exhaustible resource and dirty backstop prices are equal in period 2, the exhaustible resource must be cheaper in period 1 by (5)). Because exhaustible resource owners are first-movers and residual demand is fulfilled by the dirty backstop, a reduction in period 2 green backstop costs only reduces demand for the dirty backstop. The optimal extraction path is not affected, and since we assumed ζ Z > ζ F neither the weak nor the strong green paradox occurs.
A.10 Calibrations
In Table 2 , the expressions for (21), (16) and (18) respectively. The derivation of these equations does not depend on assumption (A.4). Substituting elasticities for the partial derivatives of the demand function, we get ∂ q
The expressions in Table 4 are analogous. Unlike in the intertemporal calibration, p Below, we provide a more detailed breakdown of the calibrations in Tables 2  and 4 . For each study, we break down the results by country. 
